The age of drone terrorism
This article was written by Baran Ayguven, Policy Fellow 2023-2024, and originally appeared in Reaction. The views in this article are the authors own.
The increased use of drones as weapons of war has not been limited to state actors. Terrorist groups are increasingly turning to suicide drones, otherwise known as kamikaze drones, as a part of their arsenal. This military technology is more like a missile in that it carries an explosive payload and self-destructs during delivery, hence the name “suicide drone”.
After Russia’s successful use of Iranian suicide drones to target Ukrainian civilians, the popularity of these suicide UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) in terror attacks has grown significantly.
Another Iranian proxy, Hamas, has also tried the same strategy which seems to be in its early stages. In similar circumstances, the Iran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq have attempted to use drones to conduct terror attacks on US bases, though these have yet to prove effective.
Recent events, however, have shown that the Houthi Rebels are succeeding in using drone technology where other terrorist groups have failed. With technological help from Iran, the Houthis have developed and successfully used their suicide drones to disrupt world trade with the purported aim of punishing allies of the State of Israel. The disruption to global trade has been so significant that the number of ships passing through the Red Sea route more than halved since November 2023. While the aerial UAV has so far been the main method of drone attack by the Houthis, naval drone attacks should also be expected to become a growing issue in the future.
The 2000 USS Cole bombing is just one case study of how devastatingly effective naval drones can be. The well-placed naval attack using just one fairly simple fibreglass ship armed with C4 explosives managed to cause significant damage to an American naval vessel. This strategy was later replicated by the Houthis in 2017 when the Saudi frigate Al Madinah became the first example of a suicide naval drone attack.
We are currently seeing similar boat attacks today by the Houthis against global trade and Western naval assets. Indeed, on 4 January, a naval suicide drone was launched which thankfully failed to cause any harm. Unlike aerial drones, naval drones have the ability to disguise themselves as civilian boats like fishing vessels.
Not only does this camouflage feature put naval assets and trade ships at risk of unnoticed attacks, but it also increases the risk of accidental civilian casualties. It is not unreasonable to foresee a case of western naval assets accidentally targeting civilian boats which are mistaken for suicide boats, especially given the rising tensions in the region.
To fight against this growing drone terrorism in the Red Sea and to prevent its expansion in the region, western allies need to urgently invest in their relatively inexpensive anti-drone capabilities. For Israel, while the drones don’t seem to pose much of a threat against civilian life and infrastructure at the moment, taking lessons from Ukraine’s experience is important. The war in Ukraine, where suicide drones have been used frequently by Russia, has shown how inexpensive suicide drones can be employed to drain the Ukrainian air defence systems, at great cost for the defendant. Indeed, shooting down drones costs much more than the drones themselves.
Another threat that should concern western allies is the potential for the capture of military drone technology after US and Israeli drones are shot down by Iran or Iran-backed militias. One possible reason for Iran’s rapid adoption and development of drone technology could indeed be the recovered equipment from the West. Western developers need to take more seriously anti-capturing strategies like self-destruction and automatic deletion of computer data. Without these, every captured US or western drone becomes a free case study for Iranian drone engineers.
The recent attack on US soldiers on 28 January in Jordan was a tragically effective showcase of the dangers of drone warfare. With just one simple drone, Iraqi terrorists succeeded in murdering three US troops and creating a major foreign policy crisis in Washington. The recent attacks on American troops in Jordan and international shipping in the Red Sea are two illustrations of the many challenges that come with drone warfare. The ability for non-state actors to inflict real damage very cheaply and the prospect for them to improve their own destructive ability by learning from the West is a grave policy concern. This is further complicated by an increased risk of human error as demonstrated in the recent Jordan attack.
Policymakers will need a serious approach consisting of developing new anti-drone technology, anti-capture technology and much better detection systems. It is obvious drones are already a threat to western security, especially in unstable regions. The West must do all it can to counter this growing and glaring security concern.
Baran Ayguven is a Policy Fellow of The Pinsker Centre, a campus-based think tank which facilitates discussion on global affairs and free speech. The views in this article are the author’s own.
