How South Africa’s 2024 Election could mark the end of the ANC’s 30-year dominance
This article was written by Matthew Brooker, Policy Fellow 2023-2024, and originally appeared in Modern Diplomacy. The views in this article are the authors own.
The 1994 election is the defining moment in South Africa’s history. The country’s first multiracial election culminated in the dismantling of Apartheid, and saw Nelson Mandela and his African National Congress (ANC) party swept into power.
No election in South Africa will ever match the significance of that vote. However, the upcoming General Election on May 29th could still mark a seismic change in South African politics.
Politics and government in South Africa have been a one-party affair since 1994; the ANC has held majorities in both houses of Parliament for the past 30 years. However, the ANC’s position as the dominant political force in South Africa looks more vulnerable than ever. An April 2024 poll from Ipsos shows the ANC polling at 40%, a long way off the 57.5% of votes the party achieved in the 2019 General Election. Polling from The Brenthurst Foundation, a South African think tank, has the ANC’s vote share at 39%.
Vote shares above 50% have allowed the ANC to rule without coalition partners since 2004. However, this all looks set to change, creating a new political landscape in South Africa. The era of total ANC dominance looks to be ending, and a new reality of coalition building could emerge.
The optimism of the post-Apartheid ‘Rainbow Nation’ has slowly evaporated. March 2024 polling shows 79% of South Africans think their country is headed in the wrong direction. Sky-high unemployment (32.1%), the highest income inequality globally, rampant corruption, and frequent electricity blackouts have left South Africans not just pessimistic but apathetic. Election turnouts have steadily been declining since an 86% high in 1994. The 2019 General Election saw 66% of registered voters turnout, with the 2021 Local Elections seeing just 45% cast their ballot.
Both pessimism and apathy are amplified among young people. The youth unemployment rate sits at 45%, and youth voter turnout is significantly lower than the average. In the 2021 local elections, less than 20% of eligible young people registered to vote, and even fewer turned out. Analysts predict youth turnout in the 2024 General Election will be below 25%.
Three main parties hope to capitalise on public dissatisfaction with the ANC: the Democratic Alliance, the centrist Official Opposition, the Economic Freedom Fighters, the far-left third-largest party, and uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK), a new left-wing populist party backed by disgraced former President Jacob Zuma. None of the three has a strong chance of forming its own government; instead, they each hope to become the minority partner in an ANC-led coalition.
The DA focuses on more traditional tactics to attract voters away from the ANC with pledges to increase economic growth, improve public services, and crack down on corruption. The DA is presenting itself as a government in waiting despite only polling between 20% and 30%.
The DA and six other smaller parties have created the Multi-Party Charter for South Africa to give themselves greater credibility. This self-described ‘Moonshot Pact’ seeks to create a united alternative to the ANC. However, the coalition is “a wickedly complex patchwork of unlikely bedfellows” ranging from the centre-left United Independent Movement to the right-wing, Afrikaner-interest Freedom Front Plus.
If the current polling holds into the election, this Moonshot Pact has little chance of forming a government without the ANC. And this, however unlikely it may be, is the only scenario where the Moonshot Pact will last beyond this election. The leader of ActionSA, one of the smaller parties in the coalition, has said the pact is “meaningless” if the seven parties don’t cumulatively receive more than 50% of the vote. Practically, the Moonshot Pact is a campaign tactic to deny the ANC a majority and force them to enter a coalition, giving the DA its first taste of national government.
However, the growth in DA support could be indirectly paving the way for the party’s worst nightmare, an ANC-EFF coalition. John Steenhuisen, the DA leader, has stated that his “number one priority […] is to prevent an ANC-EFF coalition“, but there is a strong possibility that if the ANC returns less than 50% of the vote, it will look towards the EFF instead of the DA to form the next government.
Founded and led by Julius Malema, an expelled former President of the ANC Youth wing, the Economic Freedom Fighters became South Africa’s third-largest party in less than a decade. A Marxist-Leninist, Black Nationalist party, the EFF has successfully capitalised on the anger of young Black South Africans to turn itself into a potential kingmaker at the next election.
Despite 15 years of national stagnation, the ANC has remained dominant thanks to its historic hold over many South Africans. As the party of liberation, many feel loyal to the party. However, this hold is loosening as successive scandals slowly but surely taint this image. In a country where party and government are interchangeable, an overwhelming majority of South Africans no longer see the party of Mandela as incorruptible and infallible.
Many ‘born free’ South Africans (born after 1994) don’t have the same sense of attachment to the ANC as their parents and grandparents. They view the ANC as having failed to deliver economic prosperity for the Black majority. The EFF caters to this group with attention-grabbing, radical policies of nationalisation and land expropriation. The same Ipsos poll from April 2024 shows the EFF polling at 12%.
The DA isn’t alone in worrying about an ANC-EFF coalition; the prospect presents a significant concern for Western governments. This apprehension stems from the EFF’s staunchly anti-Western and ‘anti-imperialist’ stance. The EFF wants to see South Africa pull away from Western partners and influence, a shift that could significantly alter African geopolitics. Naturally, this would lead Africa’s most industrialised nation to align closer with China, Russia and the recently expanded, Beijing-led BRICS bloc.
Late last year, former South African President and ANC leader Jacob Zuma issued a shock endorsement of uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK), a new left-wing populist party. Like the EFF, MK seeks to capitalise on the discontent of the Black majority with the ANC, but unlike the EFF, MK explicitly champions anti-immigrant and Zulu nationalist policies.
MK isn’t expected to gain widespread traction. Nor will it enter an ANC-led coalition due to the long-running personal feud between Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. However, it has performed well in local by-elections in the Zulu-majority state of KwaZulu-Natal, a historically ANC heartland. MK is expected to pull away a sizable minority of traditional ANC voters loyal to the disgraced Zuma, further condemning the ANC to coalition.
However, it’s essential to recognise that the ANC is far from a spent force. Boasting a vast grassroots campaign infrastructure, the ANC is poised to comfortably remain the largest party in Parliament. This election does not signal the end of the ANC as the primary driver of South African politics; instead, it heralds the beginning of a transformative era where coalition-building becomes a central feature.
With politics in the country on the cusp of change, there is cautious optimism. Over three-quarters of South Africans would be happy with a coalition government. Coalitions could usher in a more effective government focused on delivery and accountability, as the ANC can no longer rely solely on its historical momentum.
However, past coalitions at local and provincial levels have proved unstable. There is a risk that this will repeat nationally, as political rivals that must govern as partners will inevitably clash over policy and personal differences.
As minority parties gain influence, the balance of power shifts, yet the ANC remains in charge of South Africa’s direction. The potential choice before the ANC is stark: partner with the DA, reflecting the preference of Western nations and maintaining stability, or join forces with the EFF and pull South Africa further left and away from the West.
Like 1994, the 2024 General Election is more than a routine democratic exercise; it’s a potential prologue to a new chapter in South African politics, where the Rainbow Nation’s political colours may blend unexpectedly.
